Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII by Smith, Kathleen A.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 1 Fall 1987 Article 11 
1987 
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under 
Title VII 
Kathleen A. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Kathleen A. Smith, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 Cath. U. L. 
Rev. 245 (1988). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss1/11 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: INCONSISTENCY
UNDER TITLE VII
Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prevent spe-
cific types of employment discrimination.' Despite this mandate, federal
courts originally viewed sexual harassment as "nothing more than a personal
proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism."2 In one of the earliest opinions exam-
ining a sexual harassment claim, a court refused to find sexual harassment
actionable under title VII, commenting that the employer did not discrimi-
nate because the supervisor merely "satisfied] a personal urge."3 However,
since the late 1970's, courts have recognized that sexual harassment in the
workplace is unlawful sexual discrimination under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.4
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's ... sex."5 In 1980, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), entrusted with interpreting
and enforcing title VII, issued guidelines clarifying title VII's prohibition of
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.6 Although not binding
authority,7 the courts generally defer to the EEOC guidelines and have held
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
The legislative history for the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 reveals a broad
congressional intent to decrease employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, or sex. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139.
2. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled, Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment
is gender employment discrimination prohibited by title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 902 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (hostile environment sexual harassment violates title VII);
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (a supervisor
violates title VII when he makes sexual submission a condition of employment); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (termination of job due to gender is a prima facie
violation of title VII); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir.
1977) (employer acquiescence to supervisor's requirement of sexual favors as a condition of
employment violates title VII).
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
6. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1987). For the relevant portions of the
EEOC guidelines concerning discrimination because of sex, see id. § 1604.1 1(a)-(g).
7. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v.
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sexual harassment unlawful under title VII. s
The EEOC defined sexual harassment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature."9 Two types of sexual harassment may constitute employment dis-
crimination: "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harassment.
Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when sexual favors are demanded as
a condition of employment and a tangible job consequence follows as a result
of the employee's response.'0 Hostile environment sexual harassment occurs
when an individual's work environment is made offensive or antagonistic
due to pervasive or severe gender based harassment." An employee can
establish either form of sexual harassment to prove that she' 2 suffered un-
lawful employment discrimination.' 3
In most states, liability may attach to the employer as well as the individ-
ual who commits the sexual harassment.14 Agency principles are important
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
8. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (relying on the EEOC
guidelines). In Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), the court recognized
that title VII prohibits sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination. The court stated
that "[r]etaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined his
sexual advances, contitutes sex discrimination within the definitional parameters of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Tomkins v. Public Serv.
Elec. & Gas, 568 F.2d 1044, 1046-47 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
9. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1987). Sexual harassment is unlawful con-
duct under title VII when unwelcome sexual demands are placed on only one gender. The
unwelcome sexual advances become a condition of employment and submission to or rejection
of these advances can either affect an employment decision or make the work environment
hostile. See id. (1987). See generally Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657 (government employee
terminated because she refused to submit to supervisor's sexual demands).
10. See Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878-79 (1983) (discussing
quid pro quo sexual harassment).
11. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945 (environment made hostile by four supervisors' requests of
sexual favors from employee).
12. Generally, this Note will refer to the employee who brings the sexual harassment as
"she" or "her" for simplicity and because females are most frequently the complainants in
sexual harassment cases. Although a sexual harassment claim can be brought by either a male
or female, title VII cases are predominently brought by females. See generally Comment, A
Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461
(1986) (finding women to be the main victims of sexual harassment).
13. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986).
14. Employee suits against individuals are usually based on contract or tort theories such
as assault and battery, wrongful discharge, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. See,
e.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1203-06 (8th Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Smalley
Maintenance Sys., 711 F.2d 1524, 1533-37 (11 th Cir. 1983); Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp.
891, 894-97 (D.D.C. 1982). State law generally limits the choice of tort remedy. See generally
Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner's Guide to Tort Actions, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 879, 888-902 (1980) (discussing available tort remedies). In addi-
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in the analysis of employer liability.' 5 The position of the individual who
commits the harassment, that is, whether he or she is a supervisor or co-
worker, helps determine whether employer liability can be imputed. If the
employer knew of the sexual harassment, regardless of the identity of the
perpetrator, and did not take remedial action, the employer is liable.' 6 Lia-
bility ensues because failure to take immediate remedial action is an implicit
approval of the discriminatory conduct.17
Often, a supervisor or co-worker commits the unlawful discriminatory
conduct.18 It is difficult to determine employer liability for supervisors or
co-workers who commit sexual harassment when the employer has no
knowledge of the unlawful conduct. Most courts have held employers vicar-
iously liable for a supervisor who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment
when the supervisor uses the employer's authority to create a tangible job
consequence.19 However, because a supervisor does not necessarily use em-
ployer granted authority in a hostile environment scenario, courts have re-
quired evidence of knowledge to find employer liability.2° Nevertheless, at
least one circuit court has held employers strictly liable for the unlawful acts
of their supervisors, regardless of whether the sexual harassment is of the
quid pro quo or hostile environment form.2' The supporting rationale is
that the supervisor need not make actual use of his authority if the mere
cloak of authority enables him to sexually harass an employee.22
tion, plaintiffs may sue employers under title VII. Bringing both causes of action is advanta-
geous strategically because plaintiffs may receive punitive damages based on the tort claim, but
not under title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982); see also Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1979) (the Court discussed, but did not decide, the issue of
punitive damages under title VII); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 138 (3d
Cir. 1986) (the court found punitive and compensatory damages unavailable under title VII);
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (the court held punitive
and compensatory damages are not available under title VII).
15. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
16. Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984); Craig v. Y & Y
Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas, 568 F.2d
1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
17. Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
18. See, e.g., Barrett, 726 F.2d at 426 (harassment by co-worker); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (harassment by supervisor and co-worker); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 899 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (harassment by supervisor); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 939-41 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (harassment by supervisor).
19. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 254-55; Henson, 682 F.2d at 909-10.
20. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 255; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
21. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
22. Vinson, 753 F.2d at 150; see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2411
(1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). Agency analysis is applied to determine employer liability
for supervisors and co-workers who sexually harass employees. To find employer liability, the
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In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,23 the United States Supreme Court did
not establish a definitive rule on employer liability due to an incomplete trial
record.2 4 However, the Supreme Court did recognize that title VII prohibits
sexual harassment,2 5 that the hostile environment analysis is essential in de-
termining whether sexual harassment occurred, 26 and that an employee's
failure to invoke an employer's grievance procedure does not necessarily in-
sulate the employer from liability. 27 In addition, the Supreme Court emp-
hasized that the focus of a sexual harassment inquiry is on the
"unwelcomeness" of the advances, not the "voluntariness" of the plaintiff's
conduct.
28
In Vinson, petitioner brought a claim against her supervisor and employer
alleging that she had been sexually harassed in the workplace.29 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that Vinson was not a
victim of sexual harassment.3° The court found that Vinson had not been
required to submit to her supervisor's sexual demands in order to keep her
job or receive promotions, but rather that she had voluntarily engaged in
sexual relations. 3 Additionally, the district court held that even if sexual
harassment had been proven, the bank would not be liable because it lacked
knowledge of unlawful conduct.
32
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
courts require that the employer had knowledge of the unlawful conduct and failed to correct
the situation. Barrett, 726 F.2d at 427.
23. 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
24. Id. at 2408. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist found that the "debate over the appropri-
ate standard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the state of the
record in this case .... We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on
employer liability .... " Id.
25. Id. at 2404-05. Regarding a claim of sex discrimination under title VII, the Court
stated: "Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id. at 2404.
26. Id. at 2406. The Court found that "[slince the [EEOC] guidelines were issued, courts
have uniformly held, and we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment."
Id. at 2405.
27. Id. at 2408-09. However, the Court commented: "Petitioner's contention that re-
spondent's failure [to use grievance procedures] should insulate it from liability might be sub-
stantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment
to come forward." Id. at 2409.
28. Id. at 2406.
29. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
30. Id.




reversed and remanded the district court's decision.33 The court of appeals
criticized the district court for holding Vinson's conduct voluntary, thereby
foreclosing a finding of sexual harassment.34 The appellate court considered
the voluntariness of her participation immaterial. 3 ' Additionally, the court
of appeals remanded Vinson because the district court failed to consider the
hostile environment analysis in determining sexual harassment. 36 Further-
more, the appellate court rejected the district court's requirement of knowl-
edge for finding employer liability and held that employers may be
vicariously liable for their supervisors' sexual harassment.37
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding
that sexual harassment violates title VII.31 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, concluded that Vinson's allegations stated a cause of action for
hostile environment sexual harassment.39 The Court also determined that a
sexual harassment inquiry should focus upon whether the sexual advances
were "unwelcome," not whether the plaintiff participated voluntari-
ly.4" In addition, the majority indicated that the court of appeals erred in
holding the employer vicariously liable for the actions of its supervisor.41
Based upon the definition of "employer" given in title VII, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that Congress intended agency principles to limit employer
liability.42
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that
sexual harassment violates title VII.43 Justice Marshall, however, argued
that employers should be held vicariously liable for their supervisors' sexual
harassment, 44 emphasizing that employers are held liable for their supervi-
33. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 145-46.
38. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2403-04 (1986).
39. Id. at 2405-06.
40. Id. at 2406.
41. Id. at 2408.
42. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated:
[W]e do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency princi-
ples for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles may not be trans-
ferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to
include any "agent" of an employer ... surely evinces an intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible.
Id.
43. Id. at 2409 (Marshall, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 2409-10 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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sors' conduct for all other title VII violations.45
This Note will discuss sexual harassment and its treatment as employment
discrimination under title VII. It will trace the evolution of the quid pro quo
and hostile environment forms of harassment. It will compare and contrast
the development of title VII principles as applied in race, religion, and na-
tional origin discrimination with the development of those principles as ap-
plied in sexual harassment cases. This Note will then focus on Vinson's
effect on employers' liability for supervisors' violations.46 Finally, it will
conclude that holding employers vicariously liable for a supervisor's sexual
harassment is the most effective motivation for employers to take affirmative
steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.
I. TITLE VII's GOAL OF ERADICATING DISCRIMINATION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex.47 Title VII seeks to
prevent these forms of employment discrimination, rather than merely rem-
edy them.48 Congress entrusted the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) with the power to prevent illegal employment
discrimination.49 Pursuant to that authority, the EEOC created guidelines
interpreting title VII and setting forth requirements for employer
compliance.5°
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act because title VII was not effectively eradicat-
ing employment discrimination.5 ' The legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ment indicates congressional disappointment in the persistently
45. Id. at 2411 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. This Note will discuss, but will not focus on, the issue of employers' liability for co-
workers' sexual harassment.
47. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)
(1982)).
48. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(c), (f) (1987). The EEOC's guidelines suggest
that title VII's goal is prevention of sex discrimination in the workplace. Id. The EEOC
guidelines state that "[p]revention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment."
Id. § 1604.11 (f). Expanding upon this statement, the guidelines explain that "[a]n employer
should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring." Id. In addition,
the guidelines state that if sexual harassment is not prevented, employers can be held vicari-
ously liable for the acts of their supervisors. Id. § 1604.1 1(c).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a). Congress listed the EEOC's powers under the subheading
"Power of the Commission to Prevent Unlawful Employment Practices." Id.
50. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1987). Because of
EEOC expertise, courts typically give the guidelines great deference, but guidelines are not
controlling authority. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)
(quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
51. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2 000e (1982)).
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unacceptable level of discrimination in the workplace. 52 The Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act increased the EEOC's power to issue judicially en-
forceable cease and desist orders and extended jurisdiction of the Act to
federal and state agencies.53 The original purpose and intent of title VII was
clarified by the amendment.
Congress did not address the issue of employer liability in either the origi-
nal Act or the 1972 amendment. However, the EEOC issued guidelines
holding employers vicariously liable for supervisors discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex.54 Although courts are not
bound by the EEOC's guidelines, they generally afford them great defer-
ence. 55 For example, courts have promulgated standards based on the pur-
pose of title VII as well as the EEOC guidelines. Courts have held
employers vicariously liable for discrimination by supervisors based on race,
religion, and national origin,5
6 but not for all forms of sexual harassment.
57
Congress' desire to more effectively strengthen title VII is evident in the legislative history of
the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act. The legislative history states:
Title VII of that Act created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which
became effective July 2, 1965. In the intervening 6 years, the Commission made an
heroic effort to reduce discrimination in employment which was found to pervade
our system. Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal of equal employment
opportunity for all our citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is not adequate. . . . The persistence of discrimination, and its detrimental
effects require a reaffirmation of our national policy of equal opportunity in employ-
ment. It is essential that seven years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, effective enforcement procedures be provided the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission to strengthen its efforts to reduce discrimination in employment.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 3 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2139.
52. Discussing the proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the committee
stated:
Despite the progress which has been made since passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, discrimination against minorities and women continues .... An examination
of the statistics with respect to the progress of equal employment opportunities
clearly shows that the voluntary approach currently applied has failed to eliminate
employment discrimination. During the first 5 years of its existence, the Commission
has received more than 52,000 charges. Of these, 35,445 were recommended for in-
vestigation. Of this number approximately 56% involved complaints of discrimina-
tion because of race, 23% discrimination on sex, and the remainder involved charges
of discrimination because of national origin or religion.
Id., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2139.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 2000e-16.
54. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1987), which state that "an employer
... is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to
sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence."
55. See supra notes 7, 50, and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (race
1987]
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II. CASE LAW UNDER TITLE VII: PARALLELS OF DEVELOPMENT IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT, RACE, RELIGION, AND NATIONAL
ORIGIN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The foundation for the application of title VII in the sexual harassment
context lies in prior law developed in the race, religion, and national origin
contexts.58 However, sexual harassment discrimination cases raise distinct
considerations, making it difficult to apply the same analytical principles
used in race, religion, and national origin discrimination cases. 59 Sexual ad-
vances can be ambiguous or even welcome and, thus, cannot be treated in
the same manner as racial slurs which are intrinsically offensive and pre-
sumptively unwelcome.6" Therefore, the quid pro quo analysis used in sex-
ual harassment cases generally does not apply in race and national origin
employment discrimination cases, because an employee need not show a tan-
gible job consequence to prove that discrimination affected a condition of
discrimination); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975)
(religious discrimination); EEOC v. University of N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974)
(national origin discrimination).
57. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983), and Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 905-09 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (holding employers strictly liable for quid pro quo
harassment, but requiring knowledge for an employer to be held liable for hostile environment
harassment). But see Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (remanded to
determine existence of hostile environment and employer liability), aff'd in part and remanded
in part sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (the first hostile environ-
ment case to hold an employer strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of an em-
ployee under his supervision).
58. Sexual harassment was not acknowledged as sex discrimination prohibited by title VII
until 1976. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976). Concepts applied in the
sexual harassment context developed under race, religion, and national origin discrimination.
See generally Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972) (national origin employment discrimination); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F.
Supp. 612, 631 (W.D.N.Y.) (racial employment discrimination), later op., 22 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 557 (W.D.N.Y. 1978), later op., 472 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), modified, 633
F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980), later proceeding, 609 F. Supp. 1252 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom.
United States v. NAACP, 770 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 333 (1986);
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religious employment
discrimination). Subsequently, concepts developed in the sexual harassment context were ap-
plied in the race, religion, and national origin context. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 595 F.
Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (applying the sexual harassment quid pro quo analysis in a
religious discrimination context).
59. The federal judiciary is aware that sexual advances are sometimes welcomed and that
sexual liaisons between employees usually are private and unacknowledged. See generally
Brief for The United States and The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici
Curiae at 13, Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986) (No. 84-1979) [hereinafter





Despite the imperfect analogy between these causes of action, courts have
applied the same basic principles to all forms of employment discrimina-
tion.62 For example, the courts first developed the hostile environment form
of harassment in race, religion, and national origin cases. In Rogers v.
EEOC,63 an Hispanic plaintiff sued under title VII for national origin dis-
crimination, claiming that the employer's segregation of its clients made the
employee's work environment hostile.64 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that "a working environment [that is] heavily
charged with ... discrimination"65 may violate title VII.
6 6
The hostile environment analysis also applies in race67 and religious em-
ployment discrimination cases. In Weiss v. United States,68 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that an em-
ployee can bring a suit under title VII for religious discrimination that cre-
ates a hostile environment. 69 The court stated that "when an employee is
repeatedly subjected to demeaning and offensive religious slurs . . . by his
supervisor, such activity necessarily has the effect of altering the conditions
of his employment within the meaning of Title VII."7 In addition, the
61. But see Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (recognizing
quid pro quo harassment on religious grounds); infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
62. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir.
1977) (hostile environment national origin discrimination); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal-
ity v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir,) (hostile environment racial discrimina-
tion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (hostile environment racial discrimination); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238
(5th Cir. 1971) (hostile environment national origin discrimination), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (hostile environment
religious discrimination); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D. Ohio 1976)
(hostile environment religious discrimination).
63. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
64. Id. at 237.
65. Id. at 238.
66. Id. In addition, the court found that title VII is not limited to protecting an em-
ployee's economic interest, but can also protect an employee's psychological well-being. Id.
67. In Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
concluded that employers have a duty to provide a nondiscriminatory work environment. Id.
at 514-15. In Firefighters, the court found that the supper clubs, created by the firemen to
prepare dinners at the firehouse, excluded minority members. Id. at 514. A discriminatory
hostile environment resulted from the segregated eating facilities. Id. The court in Firefighters
ordered the district court on remand to direct the fire department to promulgate regulations
requiring the supper clubs to either include minorities or prohibit the supper clubs from using
city facilities. Id. at 515.
68. 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984).
69. Id. at 1056.
70. Id.
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Weiss court recognized that there is a parallel between religious discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment, stating that a quid pro quo form of religious
discrimination can occur when a supervisor requires an employee to change
or renounce a religious belief to receive an employment benefit.7 '
These cases illustrate that there is a parallel between the development of
title VII sexual harassment case law and that of race, religion, and national
origin case law. The race, religion, and national origin cases established the
foundation for the hostile environment analysis, currently used in the sexual
harassment context. Although these causes of action each present their own
unique problems, principles applied in these cases generally apply to all
forms of employment discrimination prohibited by title VII.
III. CASE LAW UNDER TITLE VII: APPLYING GENERAL TITLE VII
PRINCIPLES TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Originally, federal courts refused to interpret title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace.72 Williams
v. Saxbe7 3 first established that sexual harassment is sex discrimination pro-
hibited by title VII. 74 In Williams, the plaintiff asserted that she had
favorable employment conditions until she repulsed her supervisor's sexual
advances,7" after which, he harassed her and eventually terminated her em-
ployment.7 6 The court held that the termination of her employment consti-
tuted sex discrimination as prohibited by title VII because Williams was
fired for not submitting to her supervisor's sexual demands.77 In Williams
and other early cases, the courts found quid pro quo sexual harassment
71. Id.
72. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), overruled
sub nom. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Barnes v. Train, 13
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The court in Come expressed reservations about making sexual harassment a violation of
title VII. The majority concluded that "an outgrowth of holding such activity to be actionable
under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or
sexually oriented advances towards another." Come, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
73. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Williams v.
Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
74. Id. at 657. The court held that "[r]etaliatory actions of a male supervisor, taken be-
cause a female employee declined his sexual advances, constitutes sex discrimination within
the definitional parameters of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
75. Id. at 655.
76. Id. at 655-56.
77. Id. at 657-62.
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actionable 78 where an employee suffered some economic loss or other tangi-
ble employment effect. 79 The Williams holding, recognizing that sexual har-
assment is prohibited by title VII, is now accepted in all circuits.8"
In Barnes v. Costle, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia found that a government supervisor terminated the employee's
job because she refused to submit to her supervisor's sexual requests.82 The
court reasoned that the supervisor's sexual advances imposed special condi-
tions of employment on Barnes because of her gender.8 3 The court con-
78. Id. at 657. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when "a supervisor demands sex-
ual consideration in exchange for job benefits." Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir.
1983) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11 th Cir. 1982)); see also
Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983) (employee dismissed after refusing
sexual advances); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978)
(refusal of sexual advances resulted in termination); Stringer v. Commonwealth, 446 F. Supp.
704, 705 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (refusal of sexual advances resulted in unjustified criticism, harass-
ment, and eventual discharge); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 657 (refusal of sexual ad-
vances resulted in humiliation, unwarranted reprimands, and eventual termination).
79. For an example of tangible job detriments, see infra note 97.
80. See, e.g., Simmons v. Lyons, 746 F.2d 265, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1984) (sexual harassment
will constitute gender employment discrimination violative of title VII); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (hostile environment sexual harassment violated
title VII); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977)
(supervisor violates title VII when he makes sexual submission a condition of employment);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (use of gender as a criterion for termi-
nating employment is a prima facie violation of title VII); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods.,
Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer acquiescence to supervisor's requirement
of sexual favors as a condition of employment violates title VII); see also 1 A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 41.62 (1985) ("[T]he universal rule now is that
sexual harassment on the job can be employment discrimination within the meaning of Title
VII.").
81. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 984. Government employees are protected under the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (Supp. III 1973) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1970)).
83. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989. The facts illustrated the special conditions placed upon the
plaintiff as a result of her gender. The plaintiff claimed that her supervisor "repeatedly told
her that indulgence in a sexual affair would enhance her employment status; that he endeav-
ored affirmatively but futilely to consummate his proposition; and that, upon her refusal to
accede, he campaigned against her continued employment in his department and succeeded
eventually in liquidating her position." Id.
The court held "that gender was also involved to a significant degree. For while some but
not all employees of one sex were subjected to the condition, no employee of the opposite sex
was affected . I..." d. at 991. The court also cautioned:
These situations, like that at bar, are to be distinguished from a bisexual superior
who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon
participation in a sexual affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence
upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would ap-
ply to male and female employees alike.
Id. at 990 n.55.
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cluded that these special conditions constituted a prima facie case of sex
discrimination as prohibited by title VII.
84
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado refined the
reasoning of Barnes in Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 explaining that title
VII proscribes only those sexual advances that are unwanted, sufficiently
enduring, and imputed as conditions of employment. 86  As Heelan illus-
trates, the standard applied to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment is
that a condition be placed on an employee based on gender 87 and a tangible
job detriment occur as a result of this condition.88
B. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
Unlike the quid pro quo analysis, in a hostile environment analysis a
plaintiff need not show that a tangible job detriment resulted. 89 Rather, the
plaintiff is required to prove that sexual harassment occurred, resulting in a
hostile working environment. 9° The unpleasant working environment is
viewed as a discriminatory condition of employment based on gender.9'
84. Id. at 990. Two months later, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan adopted the reasoning of Barnes in Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441
F. Supp. 459, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The court recognized that sexual stereotyping, assign-
ment of specific tasks or roles to men or women based upon their sex, is not the exclusive basis
for a sex discrimination suit under title VII. Id. at 465. The court noted that title VII also
prohibits artificial barriers to employment applied to one gender and not the other, such as
sexual harassment. Id. at 465-66.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977), added to this analysis by finding that
illegal employment discrimination need not be based on characteristics "peculiar to one of the
genders." Id. at 1047 n.4 (quoting Williams v. Saxbe, 431 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976)).
Rather it need only be proved that gender was a motivating factor in the discrimination. Id. at
1047.
85. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978). In Heelan, the plaintiff's supervisor informed her
that her job would be extremely demanding requiring extensive travel and family sacrifices.
Id. at 1387. The supervisor then put his arm around Heelan and explained that while she
presently did not know the job qualifications, she would soon discover them. Id. A year later
sexual demands were made of Heelan by her supervisor who promised job security if she would
submit, and termination if she would not. These threats continued for almost two years. Id.
Heelan refused the advances and was ultimately fired. Id.
86. Id. at 1388-89.
87. Id. at 1389-90. For an example of a gender based condition placed on an employee see
supra note 83.
88. Heelan, 451 F. Supp. at 1389-90. In Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979), the
supervisor's romantic advances were not shown to affect the employee's job. Id. at 666. As a
result, no tangible employment impact could be proven, and the court dismissed the case. Id.
89. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cummings v. Walsh Con-
str. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 879 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
90. For the elements of a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment, see
infra text accompanying notes 103-04
91. In Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983), the court explained that when
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Thus, the scope of title VII claims is expanded by permitting a cause of
action based on a hostile environment in addition to a cause of action based
on quid pro quo harassment.92
In Bundy v. Jackson, 93 a court first applied the hostile environment analy-
sis in the sexual harassment context. 94 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that actionable sex discrimination
is not limited to gender-based conditions resulting in a tangible job conse-
quence, but occurs whenever sex is a motivating factor in treating an em-
ployee in an adverse manner.95 In Bundy, the plaintiff complained of sexual
harassment by four of her supervisors at various times during her employ-
ment, 96 but she could not prove that she suffered a tangible job effect. 97 De-
spite her failure to prove quid pro quo harassment, the court recognized that
sexual harassment becomes actionable when a hostile workplace is created
based on gender.
98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
hostile environment analysis in Henson v. City of Dundee. 99 Here, the plain-
tiff, a police dispatcher, claimed that the police chief sexually harassed her,
which led to her resignation.'" The court of appeals rejected a claim of
quid pro quo harassment 1 but found that the employee had a right to a
trial on the merits to determine whether sexual harassment made her job
environment hostile.'° 2 The court, clarifying the elements necessary to es-
sexual harassment "pervades the workplace, or is condoned or carried out by supervisory per-
sonnel, it becomes an illegal and discriminatory condition of employment that poisons the
work environment."
92. See Fisher, 598 F.2d at 666 (illustrating the harsh results that occurred prior to the
recognition of the hostile environment analysis).
93. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
94. Id. at 943-44.
95. Id. at 939-40.
96. Id. at 940. When the plaintiff complained to a high level supervisor about sexual
advances that two of her immediate supervisors had made to her he "casually dismissed
Bundy's complaints, telling her that 'any man in his right mind would want to rape you.' " Id.
(quoting Bundy's supervisor Lawrence Swain). He then proceeded to ask her for sexual favors.
Id.
97. Id. at 942. The district court determined that Bundy did not suffer any tangible job
detriment because of her refusal to submit to sexual advances: she was not fired, demoted, or
prevented from receiving a promotion. Id.
98. See id. at 943-44.
99. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 899. The court of appeals found that the plaintiff was not constructively dis-
charged, but chose to resign for personal reasons. Id. Because there was no tangible job detri-
ment, the court applied the "hostile environment" analysis. Id. at 901.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 912-13.
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tablish a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment,' ° 3 re-
quired the plaintiff to demonstrate that: "(1) [She] belongs to a protected
group. (2) [She] was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment. (3) The
harassment complained of was based upon sex. (4) The harassment com-
plained of affected ... terms, conditions, or' privileges of employment."' 4
The court of appeals then remanded the case to the district court to examine
the totality of the circumstances and determine whether the harassment was
enduring and offensive enough to constitute a hostile environment.'° 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the
hostile environment analysis in Katz v. Dole. 106 In Katz, an air traffic con-
troller claimed that she was sexually harassed by her fellow employees and
supervisor prior to the termination of her employment. 10 7 The court out-
lined the plaintiff's burden of persuasion in a sex discrimination suit. First,
the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of employment discrimination.'0 8
If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer must defend its action as a
valid business justification. "o9 Even if legitimate business reasons exist, the
employee may prove that the alleged business justification was merely a pre-
text for discrimination. "o
In Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co., "' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia recognized that title VII prohib-
103. Id. at 903-04.
104. Id. at 909 (emphasis omitted).
105. Id. at 913.
106. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
107. Id. at 253. The court explained that the plaintiff may have been terminated because of
her alleged involvement in an illegal strike. Id. Nevertheless, in its opinion the court found:
The FAA workplace was pervaded with sexual slur[s], insult[s] and innuendo[s], and
Katz was personally the object of verbal sexual harassment by her fellow controllers.
This harassment took the form of extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related
epithets addressed to and employed about Katz by supervisory personnel as well as
by other controllers.
Id. at 254.
108. Id. at 256; see also Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 950-51 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Adjust-
ing the components of a prima facie case to the facts presented in Bundy, the court found that:
Plaintiff must show that she belongs to a protected group, that she was qualified for
and applied for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied the promotion,
and that other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the pro-
tected group were indeed promoted at the time the plaintiff's request for promotion
was denied.
Id. at 951 (citing Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 463 F. Supp. 294, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
109. Katz, 709 F.2d at 256. This analysis is used in all title VII cases to allocate the burden
of proof. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973); see also Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
110. Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56.
111. 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
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its hostile environment sexual harassment.' 12 Moreover, the court deter-
mined that an employee's mental well-being is a "term[ ], condition[ ] or
privilege[ ] of employment" under title VII.' 3 Thus, if the sexual harass-
ment is so antagonistic and persistent that it affects the plaintiff's mental
health, a cause of action exists under title VII."
4
Despite the courts' application of similar principles to establish violations
of title VII, they do not apply the same principles to determine employer
liability. The courts find employers strictly liable for their supervisors' ra-
cial, religious, and national origin discrimination, but apply different rules to
employers whose supervisors sexually harass employees." 5
IV. EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
A. Use of Agency Principles to Determine Employer
Liability Under Title VII
Although title VII makes it unlawful for "an employer" to discriminate
on the basis of sex, it does not specify the basis for employer liability arising
from discrimination.' 16 Title VII defines the term "employer" to include as
"any agent" a person, individual, or organization "engaged in an industry
affecting commerce." ' 1 7 Courts require the application of agency principles
to establish employer liability based on this definition." 8 The term "agent"
is not explicitly defined in title VII, leading courts to struggle in the applica-
tion of agency principles to title VII law." 9 Courts try to determine em-
ployer liability by applying either common law agency principles or a
broader interpretation of agency consistent with title VII's remedial
purposes. '
20
Common law agency principles dictate that an employee is an "agent" if
112. Id. at 877.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Courts generally refuse to hold employers vicariously liable for sexual harassment.
But see Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 149-52 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in
part sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
116. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1)).
117. Id. § 2000e-(b).
118. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995-99 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring).
119. See Horn v. Duke Homes Div. of Winson Mobile Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 603-06 (7th
Cir. 1985); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of
Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes, 561 F.2d at 995-1001; Cummings v. Walsh
Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
120. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 997 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
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he acts within the scope of his employment. 121 An agent's actions fall within
the scope of his employment if he exercises either actual or apparent author-
ity. 122 Apparent authority exists when the employer's conduct makes it rea-
sonable to believe that the supervisor has authority, regardless of whether
the employer actually gave him the authority. 123  Under general agency
principles "[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment."' 24 Therefore, strict applica-
tion of common law principles would rarely result in employer liability for
employment discrimination because employers do not employ supervisors to
harass subordinates.125 Moreover, the employer could insulate himself from
liability by creating a policy against employment discrimination. For exam-
ple, if an employer had a policy against sexual harassment, sexual advances
would be considered "personal proclivit[ies],"' 1 26 outside the authority
granted a supervisor and, therefore, outside the scope of employment.
127
In contrast, a broad view of agency, consistent with title VII's remedial
purposes, would not permit this result. 12 ' The broad view of agency would
conclude that as long as the discrimination is work related, the employer is
liable for the supervisor's unlawful discrimination. This particular view of
agency places more weight on the special relationship between an employer
and his supervisors. This interpretation is similar to the one used under the
National Labor Relations Act. 129 Under the National Labor Relations Act,
if a supervisor violates section 8(a)313' by discriminating against a union
121. See EEOC Brief, supra note 59; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1958).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7, 8A (1958).
123. Id. § 8.
124. Id. § 219(2). An agent's illegal acts are imputed to a principal through the common
law principles of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Vicarious liability is in effect indi-
rect liability, whereby a principal is responsible for his agent's conduct. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1404 (5th ed. 1979); see also W. SELL, SELL ON AGENCY § 95 (1975). Similarly,
respondeat superior means that a master is liable for his servant's conduct performed in the
scope of employment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1179; see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWNE, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (1984).
125. See Note, Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 83, 96 (1985).
126. Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), overruled sub
noma. Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). Interestingly, the National Labor Relations Act defines em-
ployer as including "any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." Id.
§ 152(2). But see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 997 (1976) (MacKinnon, J., concurring)
(comparing interpretation given under the National Labor Relations Act with the interpreta-
tion to be given title VII).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
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member because of his protected status,' an employer's ignorance of this
conduct, or a supervisor's acts outside the scope of his employment and con-
trary to company policy, are immaterial; the employer would be liable.' 32
Courts determined that to do otherwise "would provide a simple means for
evading the Act by a division of corporate personnel functions."' 33
Agency law concepts such as the determination of when an agent is acting
within the scope of his employment are critical in determining employer lia-
bility under title VII. Traditional and specialized applications of agency
principles, however, have led to inconsistent results in sexual harassment
and other discrimination cases.
B. Employer Liability for Race, Religion, and National
Origin Discrimination
Without exception, employers face liability for supervisors' violations of
title VII on the basis of race, religion, and national origin.' 34 Employers are
liable even if they lacked knowledge of the unlawful discrimination. The
common law view of agency and the broad view of agency dictate this result.
For example, when a supervisor fires an employee for racially motivated rea-
sons, the employer is held liable for the unlawful discrimination. 35 The
common law theory supporting employer liability is that the employer gave
the supervisor the authority to hire or fire individuals, and is therefore, ac-
countable for the misuse of that authority.' 
36
The broad view of agency, taking into account title VII's remedial pur-
pose, also applies in race, religion, and national origin discrimination cases.
For instance, when a supervisor racially discriminates against an individual,
thereby creating a hostile work environment, the employer is liable for this
discrimination regardless of whether the supervisor acted against company
policy or outside of his authority. 137 In other words, the employer's selec-
131. Id.
132. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 997 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
133. Id. (quoting Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529, 531 (3d Cir.
1962)).
134. See sources cited supra note 56.
135. Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977).
136. This theory is summed up in an example concerning sexual harassment given in the
EEOC Brief, supra note 59, at 23, which states:
[E]mployers are likewise vicariously liable for sexual harassment practiced by super-
visory personnel where the supervisor's actions are undertaken within the scope of
authority delegated by the employer .... [T]hat is because the authority to make or
substantially influence such decisions is within the scope of authority that the em-
ployer has delegated to the supervisor.
Id.
137. See, e.g., Flowers, 552 F.2d at 1282.
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tion of and vesting of authority in the supervisor makes the employer liable
for the supervisor's discrimination against a subordinate.
Several landmark cases established the standards applied in order to deter-
mine employer liability for supervisors who discriminate on the basis of race,
religion, or national origin. 138 Flowers v. Crouch- Walker Corp. 139 is one of
the best known cases holding an employer liable for the acts of his supervi-
sors. In Flowers, a new supervisor discharged a black bricklayer and re-
placed him with a white bricklayer."4 The defendant asserted the business
justification of unsatisfactory job performance. 4 ' The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the employer's reason for discharge
pretextual.' 42 The court held that racial discrimination motivated the dis-
charge. 14 3 Significantly, the court in Flowers cast its holding broadly enough
to encompass all violations of title VII, stating that an employer should be
held liable as principal for any violation of title VII committed by an author-
ized supervisor.'" Interpreted literally, the court's holding would require
that employers be held strictly liable for all types of illegal employment
discrimination.
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan Association 141 is another case
that held an employer liable for the acts of a supervisor who violated title
VII. In Young, a supervisor who did not have authority to hire or fire re-
quired an atheist employee to attend a meeting which began with a
prayer. 14 6 The supervisor disregarded the employee's objections to the reli-
gious portion of the meeting and, against company policy, required her to
138. Id. (race discrimination); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140,
144 (5th Cir. 1975) (religious discrimination); Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp., 464
F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972) (race discrimination). Justice Marshall cited these cases to illus-
trate that employers bear vicarious liability for their supervisors' prohibited acts for other title
VII violations and to support his conclusion that employers should also be held vicariously
liable for sexual harassment. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2410 (1986) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
139. 552 F.2d at 1282.
140. Id. at 1280.
141. Id. at 1282.
142. Id.
143. Id. The court found the elements of a prima facie case of racial discrimination estab-
lished by proof that: (1) "the plaintiff was a member of a racial minority"; (2) "he was quali-
fied for the job he was performing"; (3) "he was satisfying the normal requirements in his
work"; (4) "he was discharged"; and (5) "after his discharge the employer assigned white
employees to perform the same work." Id. The defendant unsuccessfully tried to rebut the
presumption by alleging that poor work performance motivated the termination. Id. at 1283.
144. Id. at 1282. In Flowers, the court held that a "defendant [employer] is liable as princi-
pal for any violation of Title VII or section 1981 by [a supervisor] in his authorized capacity as
supervisor." Id. (citations omitted).
145. 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
146. Id. at 142.
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attend the meeting. 147 This action made working conditions unbearable for
Young, forcing her to resign. 148 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found that the supervisor constructively discharged the em-
ployee because the employer disregarded her religious beliefs.' 4 9 The court
stated further that the employer is "liable for any illegal conduct in-
volved."' 50 This statement suggests that employers should be held liable for
their supervisors' title VII violations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also examined
the issue of vicarious employer liability in EEOC v. University of New Mex-
ico. 151 In University of New Mexico, a professor claimed that he was being
discriminated against in the workplace on the basis of national origin.' 52
The court held that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act is "the elimination of
employment discrimination, whether practiced knowingly or uncon-
sciously."' 53 Accordingly, the court suggested that the employer is liable
without regard to intervening factors such as knowledge.' 54
These cases illustrate that employers are vicariously liable for the acts of
their supervisors who discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or national
origin.' 55 In such cases courts do not consider intervening factors, such as
the employer's knowledge, to be barriers to employer liability. The courts
simply hold employers vicariously liable if a supervisor discriminated against
an employee under his authority. However, this is not the case for sexual
harassment. Intervening factors such as knowledge and an employer's pol-
icy against employment discrimination can protect an employer from liabil-
ity for sexual harassment.'56
C. Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency
Under Title VII
The agency principles applied in race, religion, and national origin em-
ployment discrimination cases to determine employer liability are also con-
sidered in a sexual harassment analysis. But, because of unique concerns
147. Id. at 142-44.
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id. The court further stated that, barring undue hardship, the employer was obligated
to accommodate Young's religious beliefs and observances. Id.
150. Id.
151. 504 F.2d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1974).
152. Id. at 1298.
153. Id. at 1302.
154. See id.
155. See cases cited supra note 138.
156. See infra text accompanying notes 167-74 for examples of intervening factors recog-
nized in sexual harassment cases.
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arising in a sexual harassment context, the application of common law
agency principles leads to a bifurcated basis for determining employer liabil-
ity.'5 7 Generally, employers are vicariously liable for a supervisor's quid pro
quo sexual harassment, but not for a supervisor's hostile environment sexual
harassment unless the employer had knowledge of the harassment.' 58 This
bifurcated scheme of employer liability results because, in a quid pro quo
context, the supervisor exercises actual authority to effect a tangible job con-
sequence.'59 In a hostile environment context the supervisor indirectly in-
vokes his authority. As a result of this indirectness, courts consider other
intervening factors when determining employer liability for sexual
harassment. 6 0
Section 219(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (the Restatement)
provides that an employer is not liable for the torts of an agent acting outside
the scope of his employment unless, "the master was negligent or reckless, or
the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relationship."'' Close examination of
this principle explains why courts hold an employer vicariously liable for a
supervisor's sexual harassment if the employer has knowledge of this con-
duct and does not correct the situation. The employer may be viewed as
157. Employer liability is bifurcated in the sense that employers are held strictly liable for
quid pro quo sexual harassment but are not held strictly liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment. To hold an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor's hostile environment
sexual harassment, an employee must prove knowledge and a failure to act. See, e.g., Tomkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977). The result of this
bifurcated scheme is that it is much more difficult to hold an employer liable for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment because of factual problems that occur in proving knowledge.
Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905
(11th Cir. 1982).
158. See Katz, 709 F.2d at 255; Henson, 682 F.2d at 905.
159. Courts recognize that the supervisor effectuates a tangible job consequence, such as
firing an individual, because the employer gives him authority to make such decisions. There-
fore, courts are more willing to hold employers vicariously liable in a quid pro quo context.
See Henson, 682 F.2d at 909-10.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 166-74 for examples of intervening factors consid-
ered in a hostile environment context.
161. Section 219(2) states:
A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal and there was
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
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negligent or reckless. Moreover, the employer who, with knowledge of the
sexual harassment, fails to act, ratifies the unlawful act.' 6 2 Tomkins v. Pub-
lic Service Electric & Gas Co. 163 is one of the earliest quid pro quo cases
examining the issue of employer liability for a sexual harassment violation.
In Tomkins, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rea-
soned that to establish employer liability the plaintiff must prove that the
supervisor prescribed a condition of sexual submission and that the em-
ployer either directly or indirectly sanctioned this condition.' 64 The court
indicated that the employer effectively imposes the condition if he has
knowledge of the sexual harassment and does not immediately correct the
situation. 165
Further examination of section 219(2) of the Restatement suggests that an
employer with a valid grievance procedure and a policy against sexual har-
assment may disprove negligence or recklessness and deny that the supervi-
sor acted with apparent authority.'6 6 In sexual harassment cases, courts
apply the above factors to shield an employer from liability for sexual har-
assment. For example, the court in Barnes v. Costle 16 7 examined not only
the knowledge component but also the effect of an employer policy against
employment discrimination. In Barnes, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the employer should be gener-
ally liable for any supervisor who sexually harasses an employee under his
authority. 6 ' The employer may avoid liability, however, if any supervisor
acts against company policy without the employer's knowledge.'
69
162. In other words, the employer, by allowing this type of conduct to occur when he has
knowledge of it, implicitly encourages the unlawful behavior and is liable for it. See id. § 43.
163. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
164. Id. at 1048; see also Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983). The Craig
court also examined employer liability. The court considered whether the supervisor has au-
thority over hiring, discipline, and dismissal to be relevant factors. Id. at 80. This is the broad
analysis traditionally used to make employers vicariously liable for race, religion, and national
origin employment discrimination. Although the court made reference to this analysis, it did
not explicitly adopt it. Id.
165. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49. Similarly, the analysis of employer liability in Mun-
ford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977), concentrated on the
knowledge component. In Munford, the court held that employers are under an "affirmative
duty to investigate complaints" and rectify any title VII violations, id. at 466, and that if the
employer knew or should have known of the sexual harassment and did not investigate, he
could be held liable. Id. In Craig, 721 F.2d at 77, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit applied a similar rule, finding that if an employer has knowledge of the violation
and does not take prompt remedial steps, it would be liable. Id. at 80.
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
167. 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
168. Id.
169. Id. The court qualified this statement by holding that if the employer becomes aware
of the violation, he must promptly remedy the situation. Id.
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The company policy criterion was also examined in Heelan v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 171 where the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado held that employees need not prove that the employer has a policy
of endorsing sexual harassment.' 7' Nevertheless, according to Heelan, the
employer can escape liability by showing that the company has a policy
against this type of behavior and that the aggrieved employee did not inform
the employer of the violation.
72
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
in Miller v. Bank of America, 171 that an employee's failure to use the com-
pany's grievance procedure does not necessarily bar the employer's liabil-
ity.' 74 This holding prevents the employer from insulating itself by merely
instituting a grievance procedure. Additionally, Miller emphasized that the
employer can be held liable under title VII 17' and for the tortious conduct of
his supervisor. 1
76
Courts apply the same agency factors explained above in hostile environ-
ment cases. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit found liability where there was knowledge in Bundy v. Jackson 177
because other supervisors knew of the hostile environment and did nothing
to correct it. 178 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
focused on the knowledge component in Barrett v. Omaha National Bank. 179
The distinguishing factor in Barrett was that the harassing party was a co-
employee, not a supervisor. t ° The court found that to impose liability on
the employer, the plaintiff had to prove that the employer had knowledge of
the co-employee's sexual harassment. 8 ' According to Barrett, an em-
170. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
171. Id. at 1389.
172. Id.
173. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 214.
175. Id. at 213. The employer's liability, however, would not subject him to burdensome
penalties. Compensatory remedies are commonly used under title VII. Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1975). One of the most commonly used remedies is the
injunction. The injunction is used to prevent present and future sexual harassment. Punitive
damages are not allowed under title VII because they would be inconsistent with title VII's
goal to place the injured employee in substantially the same position as if the discrimination
had not occurred. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
176. The employer can be liable for the tortious conduct of a supervisor who sexually ha-
rasses an employee under his authority. In order for the employer to be liable the supervisor
must have the authority to "hire, fire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or
recommend such actions." Miller, 600 F.2d at 213.
177. 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
178. Id.
179. 726 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1984).




ployer's lack of awareness of the harassment relieves him of liability. 18 2 As
in the cases discussed above, the court held that if the employer knew of the
violation and took prompt remedial corrective action, he would escape
liability. 183
Bundy and Barrett, like the quid pro quo cases, found employer liability
where there was knowledge. In Katz v. Dole,184 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, went further delineating a bifurcated scheme
of employer liability requiring proof of actual or constructive knowledge of
the harassment and failure to correct the situation before it would hold an
employer strictly liable for hostile environment harassment.'8 5 In contrast,
the Katz court would hold an employer liable for quid pro quo harassment
without requiring knowledge. 186 It would, however, find liability despite a
policy against sexual harassment if an employer knew of the violation and
did nothing to correct it. 187
In Henson v. City of Dundee, 18 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that, although an employer should be held strictly lia-
ble in a quid pro quo case,' 89 the employer's knowledge and the superior's
authority should be considered when determining employer liability in hos-
tile environment cases.' 90 As a consequence, it is more difficult to hold an
employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment than for quid pro
quo sexual harassment.' 9'
Hostile environment cases have also emphasized the employer's obligation
182. Id. Most likely, this would not change even if employers were held vicariously liable
for the supervisor's acts because under an agency analysis the cloak of authority which the
employer gives to a supervisor is not given to a co-employee.
183. Id.
184. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
185. Id. at 255.
186. Id. at 255.
187. Id. at 256.
188. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
189. Id. at 909. As stated previously, a quid pro quo case can only be proven if a tangible
job detriment occurs. See supra text accompanying notes 10 & 88. Some of the tangible job
benefits which, if conditioned on sexual submission, violate title VII are the loss of favorable
evaluations, a promotion, or the job itself. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
190. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905. The court found that in order for the employer to be liable
in a "hostile environment" case, the employee must prove that the "employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." Id. The court
suggested that an employer's knowledge can be proven directly, by showing she complained to
management, or constructively, by showing the sexual harassment was so pervasive that the
employer had to know of it. Id.
191. According to Henson, the employer is strictly liable if quid pro quo sexual harassment
is proven. Id. at 909.
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to implement a policy against sexual harassment. 19 2 The Bundy court held
that employers should inform all employees that sexual harassment violates
title VII, establish a publicized grievance procedure to handle complaints of
sexual harassment, and correct valid complaints.
19 3
In Cummings v. Walsh Construction Co., '9 4 the court found the employer
liable when he knows of the sexual harassment but does nothing to remedy
the illegal conduct.' 95 The court also found the fact that the employer has a
policy against sexual harassment to be insignificant when the sexual ha-
rassment is ignored. '9 6 In addition, the court held that if the supervisor who
is sexually harassing an employee has broad power 9 7 over an individual, the
company can, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, be held liable re-
gardless of whether company policy was broken.' 9 8 In Cummings, the court
also found that it is inappropriate to consider the employee's failure to use
the company's grievance system' 99 in determining employer liability. 2"
In summary, courts originally required knowledge to hold an employer
192. See, e.g., Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978).
193. Id. These procedures were identified as things that could help employers avoid liabil-
ity. Id.
194. 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
195. Id. at 879.
196. Id. at 878.
197. Id. The term "broad powers" suggests the supervisor has power "to hire and fire (or
to participate in such decisions)." Id.
198. Id. In addition, the court found that if a hostile environment charge is proven, the
employer may be liable based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. In Cummings v.
Walsh Construction Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878-80 (S.D. Ga. 1983), the court applied the
doctrine of respondeat superior, holding the employer liable "whether the act is within the
class of acts that the agent or employee is authorized to perform; . . . [or] whether the act is
done in the course of the employer's business and for the purpose of promoting his business."
Id. at 879 (citations omitted).
The problem with this test is determining whether there was a deviation from authorized
acts. For example, in Cummings, the supervisor assigned tasks to the plaintiff that no one else
wanted to do because she refused to submit to his sexual demands. Id. at 880. These tasks had
to be done and the employer benefitted when these tasks were performed. Id. Arguably, this
violated title VII because the supervisor imposed a condition on the basis of sex which was also
an authorized employment act. Id.
199. An example of a company grievance system is a publicized committee to which em-
ployees are encouraged to complain if they believe they are being discriminated against. The
employer must inform the employees that the company is receptive to complaints and will
correct the unlawful behavior if it exists. Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382,
1390 (D. Colo. 1978).
200. Cummings. 561 F. Supp. at 878. The court was merely restating what had been found
in earlier cases. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1979). The Cum-
mings court reasoned that "Title VII rights are independent of any contractual rights. A
plaintiff is not required to submit to contractually provided arbitration before resorting to
federal court." Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 878 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974)).
[Vol. 37:245
Sexual Harassment
liable for a supervisor's quid pro quo sexual harassment, but gradually
broadened their interpretation of agency to find employers strictly liable for
their supervisors' quid pro quo sexual harassment. The courts have not,
however, held employers strictly liable for hostile environment sexual har-
assment. In the hostile environment context, the supervisor does not di-
rectly invoke the employer's authority. Courts have relied on the lack of
direct authority to justify a bifurcated liability scheme.
V. MERITOR SAVINGS BANK V VINsoN: AVOIDANCE OF THE
EMPLOYER LIABILITY ISSUE
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of sexual harassment for the first
time in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.2' In Vinson, a bank teller brought
an action under title VII against her supervisor and her employer, Meritor
Savings Bank, for sexual harassment.2 °2 Vinson testified that her supervisor
made numerous sexual advances toward her and that she eventually submit-
ted to his advances out of fear of losing her job.2" 3 Her supervisor denied the
claim. 2" Meritor Savings Bank disclaimed liability because the plaintiff had
not used the bank's grievance procedure, thus, it had no knowledge of the
alleged conduct.2" 5
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that Vinson was not the victim of quid pro quo sexual harassment.20 6 The
district court also found that if the plaintiff and her supervisor engaged in
201. 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986).
202. Vinson brought an accompanying tort claim, as evidenced by her request for "punitive
damages against Taylor, her supervisor, and the bank, and attorney's fees." Id. Punitive dam-
ages cannot be awarded under title VII. See supra notes 14, 175.
203. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2402. In Vinson, the respondent testified that shortly after being
hired her supervisor invited her to dinner and at that time suggested:
they go to a motel to have sexual relations. At first she refused, but out of what she
described as fear of losing her job she eventually agreed. According to respondent,
Taylor thereafter made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the
branch, both during and after business hours; she estimated that over the next several
years she had intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times. In addition, respondent
testified that Taylor fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
women's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forci-
bly raped her on several occasions.
Id.
204. Id. at 2403. The opinion states that "Taylor denied respondent's allegations of sexual
activity, testifying that he never fondled her, never made suggestive remarks to her, never
engaged in sexual intercourse with her and never asked her to do so." Id.
205. Id.
206. Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 43 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 753
F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
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sexual relations, it was done so voluntarily.2 °7 As a final matter, the court
noted that Meritor Savings Bank was not given notice of any sexual harass-
ment, and the court rejected Vinson's claim that notice to her supervisor
amounted to notice to the bank.2 ° 8
After examining the evidence, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the district court had misap-
plied the law and arrived at several incorrect conclusions. 2 9 The court of
appeals noted that the district court failed to consider the hostile environ-
ment analysis in its rejection of Vinson's sexual harassment claim. 210 The
court of appeals emphasized the irrelevance of whether Vinson engaged in
the conduct "voluntarily". 2 1 ' The proper inquiry should be whether the sex-
ual harassment was "unwelcome.
21 2
Finally, the court of appeals held that the employer should not be insu-
lated from liability solely because it has a grievance procedure.21 3 Instead,
the court concluded that employers could be vicariously liable for sexual
harassment. 214 The court reasoned that any other holding would frustrate
207. Id. at 42.
208. Id.
209. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and re-
manded in part sub nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986). The court
stated that evidence that the supervisor in question had made advances towards other tellers
should have been considered and that testimony of the employee's dress and provocative
speech should not have been considered. Id. at 146 n.36. The court of appeals commented
that testimony concerning Vinson's dress and personal fantasies "had no place in this litiga-
tion." Id. The court of appeals also found that evidence that Taylor sexually harassed other
women under his authority should be admitted because case law "makes clear that evidence
tending to show Taylor's harassment of other women working alongside Vinson is directly
relevant to the question whether he created an environment violative of Title VII." Id. at 146
(citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
210. Id. at 145. Because the district court held that Vinson "was not required to grant
Taylor or any other member of Capital (the Bank's former name) sexual favors as a condition
of either her employment or in order to obtain [a] promotion," the court of appeals concluded
that the district court had not considered the hostile environment form of sexual harassment.
Id. at 144-45.
211. Id. at 146.
212. Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1984)).
213. Id. at 147.
214. Id. The court stated: "We have no difficulty in concluding that an employer may be
held accountable for discrimination accomplished through sexual harassment by any supervi-
sory employee with authority to hire, to promote or to fire." Id. at 149-50. The court elabo-
rated on this statement by concluding:
The mere existence-or even the appearance-of a significant degree of influence in
vital job decisions gives any supervisor the opportunity to impose upon employees.
That opportunity is not dependent solely upon the supervisor's authority to make
personnel decisions; the ability to direct employees in their work, to evaluate their
performances and to recommend personnel actions carries attendant power to co-
erce, intimidate and harass.
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the intent of title VII. 2 15
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
rejected a petition for rehearing en banc. 216 The court of appeals' dissent,
written by Circuit Judge Bork, suggested that the majority was wrong to
hold employers vicariously liable for sexual harassment.217 He reasoned
that by doing so, the court would convert employers into insurers that all
workplace relationships will be asexual.218 The dissent found this unjust
considering the employer had done all it could reasonably do to prevent this
type of conduct.219
The United States Supreme Court recognized hostile environment sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under title VII.
220
The Court also held that the mere existence of a grievance procedure and a
policy against discrimination, linked with the employee's failure to use this
procedure, does not necessarily insulate the employer from liability.22'
However, the Court remanded the case for application of the hostile environ-
ment analysis based on the incompleteness of the record,222 thereby avoiding
a decision on the employer liability issue.223
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 224 criticized the district court
for neglecting to consider the hostile environment, as well as the quid pro
quo form of sexual harassment. 225 Addressing the issue of employer liabil-
ity, Justice Rehnquist declared that the "debate over the appropriate stan-
dard for employer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the
state of the record in this case."' 2 26 The majority did not create a definitive
Id. at 150.
215. The court reasoned that "[T]o hold that an employer cannot be reached for Title VII
violations unknown to him is, too, to open the door to circumvention of Title VII by the simple
expedient of looking the other way, even as signs of discriminatory practice begin to gather on
the horizon." Id. at 151.
216. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting, joined by
Scalia & Starr, JJ.).
217. Id. at 1332 (Bork, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1331 (Bork, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1331 nn.2-3 (Bork, J., dissenting).
220. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2405 (1986).
221. Id. at 2408-09. However, this conclusion was not without qualification in the majority
opinion. Justice Rehnquist stated "[p]etitioner's contention that respondent's failure should
insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated
to encourage victims of harassment to come forward." Id. at 2409.
222. Id. at 2408.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2402. Justice Rehnquist was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, Justices White, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id.
225. Id. at 2406.
226. Id. at 2408.
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rule on employer liability.227
In contrast, Justice Marshall, in a brief concurrence found that the issue
of employer liability was properly before the Court.2 28 Relying heavily on
the EEOC guidelines and general title VII law, Justice Marshall concluded
that employers should be held vicariously liable for the activities of supervi-
sors who sexually harass employees under their authority.22 9 Justice Mar-
shall reasoned that an employer can only act through individual supervisors
and employees. 23' Therefore, a supervisor's actions should be imputed to
the employer for sexual harassment as they are imputed under federal labor
law.23 '
Although the majority declined to create a definitive rule on employer
liability, dicta indicated that if the issue of employer liability could be
reached, agency principles should be applied.232 The majority also cited sec-
tions of the Restatement for guidance.233 In response, Justice Marshall ad-
dressed the proper application of agency principles in a sexual harassment
context. Restating Justice Rehnquist's theory that title VII places some lim-
its on employer's liability, Justice Marshall described a situation where lia-
bility would be limited. Justice Marshall concluded: "[w]here, for example,
a supervisor has no authority over an employee, because the two work in
wholly different parts of the employer's business, it may be improper to find
227. Id. Justice Rehnquist found that "[t]his debate over the appropriate standard for em-
ployer liability has a rather abstract quality about it given the state of the record in this
case. . . .We therefore decline the parties' invitation to issue a definitive rule on employer
liability ... " Id.
228. Id. at 2409. Justice Marshall stated: "Because I believe that question to be properly
before us, I write separately." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 2409-10 (Marshall, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 2410 (Marshall, J., concurring).
231. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 129-33.
232. Justice Rehnquist stated:
We do agree with the EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency princi-
ples for guidance in this area. While such common-law principles may not be trans-
ferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to
include any "agent" of an employer, surely evinces an intent to place some limits on
the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible.
Id. at 2408 (citation omitted).
233. Justice Rehnquist cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-37 (1958). Id.
These sections explain the relationship between a third person and a principal for the torts of
his servant. See supra note 161. It is the application of the principles announced under these
sections that lead to a bifurcation of employer liability, as well as the examination of interven-
ing factors. Consequently, if agency principles such as § 219 are applied to determine em-
ployer liability, the employer will be much less likely to be held vicariously liable. See supra




strict employer liability. 23 4
Realizing that the application of agency principles can lead to several dif-
ferent results, Justice Marshall also chose to address the argument made by
the Solicitor General in an amici curiae brief on behalf of the EEOC. 235 The
Solicitor General favored a rule which differentiates between employer liabil-
ity for hostile environment and that for quid pro quo cases.2 3 6 Such a rule
would impute liability to an employer for quid pro quo sexual harassment,
but would require knowledge to hold an employer liable for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment. 23 7 The Solicitor General based this rule on the
argument that "the supervisor is not exercising, or threatening to exercise,
actual or apparent authority to make personnel decisions affecting the vic-
tim" in a hostile environment context.23 8
Justice Marshall rejected this argument. Reasoning that the supervisor's
position permits him to commit the wrong, Justice Marshall found no justifi-
cation for a rule requiring notice to an employer in the hostile environment
context to create liability.2 39 The concurring opinion concluded that the em-
ployer liability rules applicable in all other title VII cases should be applied
in sexual harassment cases.24 °
VI. PROSPECTS FOR VICARIOUS LIABILITY AFTER MERITOR SAVINGS
BANK v VINsoN
The majority opinion in Vinson did not prescribe a method for determin-
ing employer liability for sexual harassment.2 4  Thus, the majority did not
provide the lower courts with clear guidance on the appropriate standard for
234. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2411 (Marshall, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 2410 (Marshall, J., concurring).
236. For an explanation of the EEOC's application of agency principles to sexual harass-
ment, see EEOC Brief, supra note 59, at 24. But see EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c)
(1987).
237. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2410 (Marshall, J., concurring).
238. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting EEOC Brief, supra note 59, at 24).
239. Justice Marshall concluded:
The Solicitor General's position is untenable. A supervisor's responsibilities do not
begin and end with the power to hire, fire, and discipline employees, or with the
power to recommend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-
day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive, work-
place. There is no reason why abuse of the latter authority should have different
consequences than abuse of the former. In both cases it is the authority vested in the
supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely
because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that
he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.
Id. at 2410-11 (Marshall, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 2411 (Marshall, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 2408.
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deciding employer liability. The majority opinion does provide support for
adherence to the basic concepts expounded in prior sexual harassment case
law.242 Adherence to the concepts expounded in prior sexual harassment
case law would lead to a narrow application of agency principles resulting in
a bifurcated analysis for determining employer liability.2 43
For instance, Justice Rehnquist commented: "[W]e . . . agree with the
EEOC that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for gui-
dance in this area.",244 In addition, Justice Rehnquist believed that "[w]hile
such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars
to Title VII, Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include any 'agent' of
an employer ... surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of
employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsi-
ble."' 245 Application of strict common law agency principles would limit
employer liability, especially in the hostile environment context, by adding
to the plaintiff's burdens.246 Finally, Justice Rehnquist's citation of the Re-
statement (Second) of Agency suggests adherence to the prior law require-
ment of employer knowledge.24 7 Section 219(2) shields employer liability
"for the torts of... servants acting outside the scope of the employment."24
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist's willingness to apply agency rules in a tort
context 24 9 is likely to lead to a bifurcated analysis for determining employer
242. Id. at 2404-06. The basic concepts expounded in prior sexual harassment case law
require a bifurcated scheme of employer liability, whereby employers are held strictly liable for
quid pro quo sexual harassment but not held strictly liable for hostile environment sexual
harassment. See infra note 250.
243. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See supra note 157.
247. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2408 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-37
(1958)); see also supra notes 157-61.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). Employers rely on this sec-
tion to avoid liability because they assert that the acts performed by the employee were not
within the scope of his employment. Typically, in a hostile environment sexual harassment
case, employers rely on this section by stating that the sexual advances were purely personal
acts not authorized by the employer. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
249. The appellate court in Vinson warned that the application of tort principles was inap-
propriate in a sexual harassment context. The court of appeals explained:
Traditional principles of respondeat superior, as they obtain in the field of torts, are
not altogether suitable for resolution of questions of Title VII law .... More partic-
ularly, limitations imposed by the doctrine of respondeat superior have no place in
enforcement of the congressional will underlying Title VII. Confining liability, as the
common law would, to situations in which a supervisor acted within the scope of his
authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that employers would be-
come accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervi-
sors to molest women employees.
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liability.25° It is not clear how Justice Rehnquist would handle employer
liability, but the above mentioned factors suggest that the Court may adopt a
bifurcated analysis.
Such a ruling would be problematic. First, there is little merit in differen-
tiating employer liability based upon the type of sexual harassment alleged.
In both instances, it is the authority granted the supervisor that allows him
to sexually harass a subordinate, regardless of whether the supervisor actu-
ally uses this authority.2 5' Consequently, there is little justification for re-
quiring proof of knowledge in order to hold an employer liable for hostile
environment sexual harassment.2 52
The difficult factual problems that arise when trying to prove knowledge
in the hostile environment context would place a substantial burden on an
individual alleging harassment.2 53 In addition, other intervening factors
would be considered when determining employer liability for hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment, such as the employer's grievance procedure and
the employer's policy against discrimination.2 54 Although the majority in
Vinson held that an employer's policy against discrimination and an em-
ployee's failure to use the employer's grievance procedure do not necessarily
insulate an employer from liability,25 5 Justice Rehnquist did not rule out
their relevance.2 56 Justice Rehnquist stated that an argument for insulation
from liability would be given more weight if grievance "procedures were
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and remanded in part
sub nom. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
250. When agency principles, as applied in tort, are used in a sexual harassment context,
the unlawful conduct appears to be outside the scope of employment. But, because a supervi-
sor is given authority by an employer to hire, fire, or discipline and invokes this authority in a
quid pro quo context, the employer can still be held strictly liable. In contrast, a supervisor
does not directly use his authority in the hostile environment context so employers are not held
strictly liable. Hence, the result is a bifurcated analysis of employer liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-60.
251. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 th Cir. 1982); Cummings v.
Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 878 (S.D. Ga. 1983); see also infra note 252.
252. As Justice Marshall stated in Vinson, regarding the authority invested in a supervisor
who makes an individual's environment hostile by sexual harassment contrasted to the author-
ity invested in a supervisor who commits quid pro quo sexual harassment:
There is no reason why abuse of the latter authority should have different conse-
quences than abuse of the former. In both cases it is the authority vested in the
supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely
because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer's authority that
he is able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.
Vinson, 106 S. Ct. at 2410 (Marshall, J., concurring).
253. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
255. 106 S. Ct. at 2408-09.
256. Id. at 2409.
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better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward. 2 57
This suggests that adoption of a good grievance procedure and announce-
ment of a strong policy against sexual harassment might insulate an em-
ployer from liability.2 58
The bifurcation of employer liability for sexual harassment does violence
to the policies supported in title VII. Employers are not motivated to adopt
and enforce effective policies to prevent sexual harassment when they may be
able to escape liability simply through the announcement of company policy
and a claim of no knowledge of the sexual harassment.25 9 Instead, employ-
ers could seek stronger preventive measures by warning supervisors of the
serious consequences of their discrimination against an employee and require
them to keep a watchful eye for these types of violations.2 6 ° Educating and
involving the supervisors in the process of identifying and preventing em-
ployment discrimination would help promote title VII objectives. 26 '
Furthermore, holding employers vicariously liable for both forms of sex-
ual harassment achieves consistency under title VII. Currently employers
are not held vicariously liable for sexual harassment but are held vicariously
liable for race, religion, and national origin discrimination.2 62 This inconsis-
257. Id.
258. In Vinson, the grievance procedure was ineffective because Mechelle Vinson was sup-
posed to report her harassment to the perpetrator of the sexual harassment, her supervisor. Id.
at 2409. A better grievance procedure would be one calculated to encourage employees to
report the illegal discrimination such as a publicized committee responsible for investigating
these matters. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. However, even this committee
might not encourage employees to come forward if it routinely dismissed complaints, or if the
perpetrator was a member of the committee. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (employee reported harassment to three other supervisors, all of whom also
harassed her); supra note 96.
259. Instead, employers may be concerned with facially meeting the requirement, by estab-
lishing a policy against discrimination on paper, but not taking the effort and expense to actu-
ally enforce the policy. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
260. Supervisors might be less likely to sexually harass an individual under their authority
if the likelihood of discharge and financial liability was high. If the supervisors understand
that they will lose their jobs if caught sexually harassing employees under their authority, they
may be much less likely to commit the unlawful conduct. Similarly, if penalties are imposed
on a supervisor who has knowledge of sexual harassment, but fails to report it, this conduct is
less likely to go unnoticed. See Horn v. Duke Homes Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, 755
F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985).
261. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-Sexual Harassment and Title VII-Fe-
male Employees' Claim Alleging Verbal and Physical Advances by a Male Supervisor Dismissed
as Nonactionable, Come v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 164 (1976); see
also Cerutti, Differing Standards of Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment of Working Wo-
men, 27 ARIz. L. REV. 155, 163 (1985).
262. See supra note 56 for title VII cases of race, religion, and national origin employment




tency under title VII sends mixed signals to employers. It could lead em-
ployers to view sexual harassment as a less serious problem than race,
religion, or national origin employment discrimination. Such an attitude is
contrary to the policies embodied in title VII.
2 6 3
VII. CONCLUSION
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court recognized that
sexual harassment, which creates a hostile environment in the workplace, is
a form of employment discrimination violating title VII of the Civil Rights
Act. The Court, in dicta, suggested however that unlike other forms of em-
ployment discrimination an employer is not necessarily liable for hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment. By differentiating the method of determining
employer liability for sexual harassment from the analysis used for other title
VII violations, the Court implies that the prevention of sexual harassment is
not as important a policy objective as the prevention of other forms of pro-
hibited discrimination. This may cause employers to look the other way
when suspecting that an employee, who has not directly informed the em-
ployer, is being sexually harassed. In contrast, imposing vicarious liability
on employers will motivate them to take affirmative steps to prevent the seri-
ous problem of sexual harassment in the workplace.
Kathleen A. Smith
263. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
19871

